

DD/O 76-7762

Executive Registry

76-3758

CI 807-76

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA : Deputy Director for Operations
FROM : Chief, Counterintelligence Staff
SUBJECT : Counterintelligence and the DDS&T

During the recent EAG meeting on counterintelligence you asked that I explore with the DDS&T areas of possible cooperation. The attached memorandum reflects our follow through on your request. As you will note our discussion revealed certain steps we can take to assist the DDS&T. The implementation of these steps will take us outside of the DDO somewhat, but I think that is proper.

Attachment:
As Stated Above

25X1

E2 IMPDET
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SECRET

19 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with DDS&T Representatives

1. On 12 October 1976, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, and the undersigned met for about one hour with the Deputy Director for S&T, Mr. Les Dirks, and the SA/DDS&T, [] in the office of the DDS&T.

2. The purpose of the meeting was to mutually explore ways in which the Counterintelligence Staff might contribute meaningful counterintelligence support to the activities of the Directorate for S&T. By way of introduction the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, provided the DDS&T copies of two studies which the CI Staff had prepared.

3. The DDS&T indicated that he welcomed the initiative to discuss the topic as he believed the Directorate needed and could benefit from a sharpened defensive and counterintelligence program. He stated that while he believed the Directorate quite adequately could cope with the technical security pertaining to its programs, he thought the Directorate did have vulnerabilities in the personnel side of its activities and he specifically cited the field installations maintained by the Directorate in [] He discussed briefly the security arrangements concerning these installations. He noted that very little was done in briefing or debriefing staff and contract personnel assigned to such field elements. He also noted that the DDS&T has certain domestic vulnerabilities through its rather extensive involvement with U.S. contractors. He thought that the Counterintelligence Staff might well be able to assist the Directorate in coping with the problem.

4. A discussion ensued concerning the reliance on [] for the security and counterintelligence support to the [] site and the role which [] plays in the physical security of the [] installation. The DDS&T representatives noted that the Soviets are undoubtedly aware of all these sites [] the [] site. In discussing the possible extent to which

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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1A the Soviets might go to gain some insight into the activities of these installations, it was noted that recently the Soviet Ambassador together with certain of his KGB representatives had

[redacted] site.

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5. The Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, noted that there had been an informal working relationship in previous years between the DDS&T and the CI Staff but that no records existed covering the substance of those relationships. All agreed that the DDS&T would benefit from a reestablishment of a working relationship with the CI Staff and that we would continue discussions to develop the procedures for implementing this. As a start, Chief, CI Staff asked that the DDS&T plan to send two officers to the next running of the Counterintelligence Operations Course in November 1976. (The DDS&T subsequently advised that it intended to do so and that it would send the Headquarters officers who are responsible for the [redacted])

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1A The DDS&T asked that the Staff consider developing an abbreviated counterintelligence briefing program which could be given in one or two days and which would be designed for DDS&T officers departing for assignments to DDS&T overseas sites. The Chief, CI Staff agreed to do so. The DDS&T indicated that at some point he would also plan to send some of his officers [redacted] to the Counter-
1A intelligence Operations Course. Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, suggested that at some point in the future it might be useful for a representative from the Staff together with a representative from the DDS&T to visit the DDS&T overseas sites to discuss the counterintelligence threat with the site members as well as the liaison officers involved in supporting those sites.

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6. It was agreed that additional discussions will be held to further refine ways in which the Staff and the Directorate can develop a mutually beneficial working relationship.

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[redacted]
Acting Executive Officer
Counterintelligence Staff

cc: DDCI
DDO
DDS&T

DDO: O/CI: AEXO [redacted]

1-C/CI

1-AEXO

1-C/CI/IRG

2

SECRET

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USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

EXTENSION

NO.

CI 807-76

DATE

19 OCT
1976

25X1A

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDO Registry

19 OCT 1976

2.

3.

DDO

19 OCT 1976

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4.

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21 Oct 76 J.C.

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

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Good!

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Executive Registry

76-10/85

DDIO 76-7290

4 OCT
1976

CI 774-76

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

X1A FROM : [REDACTED]
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

X1A SUBJECT : [REDACTED] Penetrations of CIA - CI Staff Studies
1 and 2

X1A As I mentioned during the EAG meeting of 28 September,
we have done two CI Staff studies on the subject of pene-
trations of the CIA by [REDACTED]. These studies, which are
attached, were disseminated to all DDO Division chiefs and
to the DDI in early 1976 as part of our counterintelligence
educational effort.

Attachments: 2
As Stated Above

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CI staff / DDO